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INTRODUCTION

Prompted by persistent complaints-particularly from the
information and communication technology (ICT) industriesabout the dangers allegedly posed by strong patents of poor
quality, both the legislative and judicial branches have recently
made attempts at patent reform. At least for the moment,
legislative reform has been thwarted, largely by opposition from
the biopharmaceutical industry.' The current logjam over
legislative reform might lead to the pessimistic conclusion that
reform is likely to be either zero sum (one set of industry
interests is able to garner more votes than its opponent and
override the legitimate interests of the other) or founded in
disparate treatment of different industries (a departure from the
much-heralded "unitary" nature of the patent system).
This Article argues that such a conclusion would be
premature. One important counter to the pessimistic view is the
example of the Supreme Court's recent judicial reform. Although
the biopharmaceutical industry has been quite opposed to this
reform,2 the evidence thus far suggests that the Court's decisions
may have only a limited impact on the legitimate interests of the
industry. Specifically, although the Court's decisions adopt a
facially neutral approach, this approach is likely to have a
disparate impact that leaves relatively untouched the patent law
that surrounds core product claims to small molecule drugs. To
put the point another way, the Court has, by adopting the
"standards"-based approach of traditional patent jurisprudence,'

1.
In addition to the biopharmaceutical industry, universities, certain
manufacturing interests, and some groups affiliated with small firm innovators (including
small firms outside biopharmaceuticals) have also opposed reform. Although this Article
focuses on the ICT versus biopharmaceutical divide, it touches on issues faced by small
firm innovators in Part II.
2.
In the nonobviousness case of KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., for
example, the trade groups for the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industriesBiotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)-filed amicus briefs opposing any change in the
nonobviousness standard. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondents, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350); Brief of Biotechnology Industrial Organization as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350). BIO and
PhRMA also filed briefs endorsing the status quo in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in
Support of Respondent, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05130); Brief of Biotechnology Industrial Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130).
3.
The literature on rules versus standards is, of course, voluminous. For a
prominent economically oriented approach, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
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taken into account, at least in part, the disparate technical
challenges associated with information creation and development
for different innovators.
The analogy to antidiscrimination law is a compelling one:
as students of antidiscrimination law know, facially neutral
standards often have disparate impact. In the case of patents, the
disparate impact is a feature, not a bug.4 Moreover, when
deployed properly, patent law's standards-based approach makes
it sensitive not only to disparate technical challenges but also, in
significant part, to disparate economic structures of information
creation and development.'
Two other counters to the pessimistic view bear emphasis.
First, to the extent that the outlier set of inventions appears to
be biopharmaceutical therapeutics, this industry is embedded in
a web of non-patent based market and regulatory structures that
do much of the heavy lifting in terms of setting up barriers to
entry and influencing price. The two most salient structures are
Food & Drug Administration (FDA) regulation and the health
insurance industry.6 Although these non-patent structures are of
course technologically specific, they are narrowly tailored to the
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). Standards have the obvious
liabilities of increased uncertainty (until the standard is applied in a given case) and of
requiring a competent decisionmaker to apply the standard. The important question of
whether patent law should (in the main) be standards-based is beyond the scope of this
short Article. I take on that question, concluding that a standards-based approach is both
formally and functionally justified, in Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1116-22
(2003) (concluding that a standards-based approach is both formally and functionally
justified).
4. Accord Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1641-58 (2003) (discussing "micro" policy levers, implemented through
standards like utility and level of ordinary skill in the art, that operate at the level of
individual inventions but tend to have differential impact).
5.
For some prior discussions of this point, see FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 3-14
(2003); Stuart Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA: What the Patent System
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 276-278 (2006).
6.
The idea that FDA regulation serves as "innovation policy" is hardly new. See,
e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007). The notion that the health insurance industry (which is itself
highly regulated) heavily influences the structure of pharmaceutical innovation has been
less discussed by patent law scholars. Health economists and health law scholars have
emphasized this feature, however. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon & Mark V. Pauly, Health
Insurance and the Growth in PharmaceuticalExpenditures, 45 J.L. & ECON. 587, 589
(2002) (arguing that expansions in health insurance are largely responsible for growth in
pharmaceutical expenditures); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches
Pharmaceuticals:BalancingInnovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics
Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 207-08 (2001) (discussing insurance-induced moral hazard
and the need for tort and contract law to allow health insurance firms to make costbenefit trade-offs in coverage of pharmaceuticals).
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peculiar economic questions raised by end product therapeutics.
Thus applying FDA and health insurance regulation is likely to
raise fewer problems of line drawing than attempts to develop a
sui generis patent regime for biopharmaceutical innovation as a
whole. To put the point another way, a patent law carve out for a
given "industry," which may be hard to define and may not be
particularly homogenous in the types of innovation it produces, is
neither fish nor fowl-neither an easily applied rule nor a policy
and context sensitive standard. In contrast, FDA and health
insurance regulation are, for the most part, narrowly tailored to
the specific concerns raised by end product therapeutics.
Finally, in those situations where neither existing patent
law standards nor existing regulation specific to end product
therapeutics is sufficiently sensitive to relevant considerations of
economic policy, additional facially neutral standards could be
implemented. Like patent law's existing standards, these would
operate at the level of invention and would not require attempts
to draw blunt (over-inclusive and under-inclusive) lines between
industries. Certain tweaks to FDA and health insurance
regulation may also be worth contemplating.
A larger point that emerges from this analysis involves the
need to avoid tunnel vision in thinking about regulatory systems
that foster innovation. In many cases, the optimal resolution for
a given policy puzzle may involve more than one system.7
Part II of the Article gives a brief background on the
dissatisfaction with the patent system that spurred Supreme
Court interest. Part III discusses the most salient recent cases
and their relatively modest effects on core product claims to
small molecule drugs. Part IV suggests mechanisms through
which additional facially neutral patent reform as well as tweaks
to FDA and health insurance regulation could be used to take
account of remaining economic concerns.

7.
Stuart Benjamin and I discuss this larger point at some length in Stuart
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
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II. BACKGROUND:
THE PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS DISCONTENTS"

The Supreme Court has, in the last few years, rediscovered
the area of patent law.9 The Court's renewed interest in patent
law appears to have been sparked by the growing tide of criticism
of the patent system that began to emerge in the late 1990s. In
2003 and 2004, respectively, the Federal Trade Commission and
the National Academy of Sciences issued prominent reports
calling for (inter alia) the invigoration of the nonobviousness
standard for determining patent validity.' ° In addition, starting
in the late 1990s, various scholars began to emphasize the failure
of the patent system to establish clear patent validity and scope
when the patent is first issued."
The evidence suggests that problems of obvious patents and
patents with vague boundaries are particularly salient outside
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Indeed, based on their
assessment of renewal data, market value regressions, and stock
market valuations before and after announcements of patent
litigation, James Bessen and Michael Meurer argue that, by the
late 1990s, publicly traded firms reaped benefits from patents
that clearly exceeded the costs created by the need to defend
against patent infringement suits in the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries only."
The scholarly focus on these industry-based differences
notwithstanding, recent judicial reform does not purport to draw
explicit distinctions based on industry. On the face of it, then, one
might surmise that such reform would create problems for the
biopharmaceutical industry. However, as the next section
8.
With apologies to Sigmund Freud, and more recently, Adam Jaffe and Josh
Lerner, who authored a 2004 critique of the patent system titled Innovation and Its
Discontents. The title of the Jaffe and Lerner book is a bit misleading, as it focuses on the
patent system only. See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004). In contrast, the empirical evidence (some of
which is discussed further below) indicates that, for publicly traded manufacturing firms
in most sectors, patents play only a small role in spurring innovation.
9.
I say "rediscovered" because the Court was reasonably active in the patent
arena during the period from 1940-1970. The number of cases it took during these
periods averaged between 2 and 6 a year. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, in 2002 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 273,
288 (Dennis J. Hutchinson, David A. Strauss & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2003).
10.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 3; STEPHEN A MERRILL, RICHARD C.
LEVIN & MARK B. MYERS, NATL ACAD. OF ScIs., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

59 (2004).
11.
See, e.g., Craig Nard, Certainty, Fence-Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND.
L.J. 759 (1999).
12.
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 162-63 (2008).
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discusses, the two most salient facially neutral cases, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.1 ' and KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., have not thus far created significant problems, at least for
legitimate interests of the industry in the form of core product
claims to small molecule drugs."

III. RECENT JUDICIAL REFORM
A. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
In the 2005 legislative battle over patent system reform, the
ICT industries challenged the Federal Circuit's bright line rule in
favor of automatic permanent injunctive relief once validity and
infringement had been determined. 6 The industries supported
legislation that would have required courts to evaluate the
"fairness" of injunctive relief in light of "all the facts and the
relevant interests of the parties." 7 Opposition to this provision by
the biopharmaceutical industry was one of the reasons that the
2005 patent reform bill failed in Congress."
To a significant extent, the legislative logjam has been
circumvented by the Supreme Court's decision in eBay. In that

13.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
14.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 1727 (2007).
15.
Ironically, a Supreme Court case that may create problems for certain sectors of
the biotechnology industry (though it may alleviate problems for the pharmaceutical
industry and for larger, vertically integrated biotechnology firms that manufacture
products) is Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005), a case that
involves the Court's interpretation of regulation aimed at facilitating the entry of generic
pharmaceuticals. In that case, the Court held that the language of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which creates a statutory exemption from patent infringement liability for research
done to generate data for an FDA submission, is sufficiently capacious to cover research
not only on generic versions of patented drugs (the intention of the Hatch-Waxman
drafters) but also research that yields data that does not ultimately end up being
submitted to the FDA. See id. at 206-07. Some commentators have expressed concern
that, after Merck v. Integra, the Hatch-Waxman research exemption will be interpreted
broadly to cover a large percentage of research that uses the biotechnology industry's
patented research tools. E.g., Michael Sertic, Note, Muddying the Waters: How the
Supreme Court's Decision in Merck v. Integra Fails to Resolve Problems of Judicial
Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1), the "Safe Harbour" Provision of the HatchWaxman Act, 17 HEALTH MATRIx 377 (2007).
16.
PatentAct of 2005: Hearingon H.R. 2795 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 77-78
(2005) (statement of Computer & Communications Industry Association).
17.
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
18.
See, e.g., Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, The "PatentAct
of 2005" Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28-29 (2005) (statement of Robert B. Chess,
Executive Chairman, Nektar Therapeutics) ("If you allowed courts to weigh equities and
balance hardships, our patents would be weakened, and research and development would
suffer.").
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case, the Court unanimously held (contra the Federal Circuit)
that permanent injunctive relief was not mandatory in cases
where validity and infringement had been proven. The Court left
to the discretion of the trial court the question of whether
injunctive relief should be granted in any given case. 9
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy specifically
identified as problematic the imposition of injunctive relief in
those cases (common in the ICT industries) where the plaintiffs
patent represents only a small portion of the ultimate infringing
technology." In such cases, the availability of injunctive relief
can give the patent holder leverage to extract rents in excess of
the contribution actually made by the patentee.2
Though it is facially neutral, the eBay decision does not
appear to have created significant problems for the
biopharmaceutical industry. Lower court cases interpreting eBay
tend to find irreparable harm, and grant injunctive relief, in
cases where the patentee and the infringer are competitors.2 2 A
large percentage of biopharmaceutical litigation involves this
situation. The prototypical example is a challenge by a generic to
a brand name pharmaceutical firm's patent-based monopoly over
a given drug.22
One might argue that the eBay decision could pose problems
for smaller biotechnology firms that do not themselves
manufacture products (and hence would not be in direct
competition with the alleged infringer) but, instead, create
technology and early-stage products that they then license to
manufacturing firms. On this view, injunctive relief prevents

19.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
20.
Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
21.
See id.
22.
Compare TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding irreparable harm in cases concerning direct competitors), Smith
& Nephew, Inc. v. Snythes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (same), and Visto
Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 3741891, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 2006) (same), with z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440-41
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no irreparable harm where the parties do not compete), and
Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (same).
23.
To be sure, in several biopharmaceutical cases involving preliminary injunctive
relief, district courts have invoked eBay to deny such relief. See, e.g., Altana Pharma AG
v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681-82 (D.N.J. 2007); Novartis Pharms.
Corp. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 05-CV-1887 (DMC), 2007 WL 2669338, at *13
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2007). Even before eBay, however, the Federal Circuit had made it clear
that denying preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate in these types of
circumstances. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that it is within the discretion of the district court to grant or
deny a preliminary injunction).
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larger firms from simply infringing patented technology held by
smaller firms, secure in the knowledge that in the worst case
scenario all the larger firm will have to do is pay damages not
significantly larger than the cost of a license. Thus, to the extent
that promoting small firms and "markets for technology"2 4 should
be an objective of innovation policy (on the theory that small
firms are likely to be more innovative than large firms),25 one
might argue that eBay could prove detrimental to innovation
both in the biopharmaceutical industry and more generally.
This view may, however, underestimate the flexibility
afforded trial courts by the eBay standard. The Court's decision
observes that "[slome patent holders.., might reasonably prefer
to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure
the financing necessary to ... [do the] market[ing] themselves.
Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the traditional fourfactor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying them
the opportunity to do so. "6 In an instructive opinion, the district
court noted in the eBay remand that irreparable harm may be
found where a patentee is seeking to develop its patent in
partnership with others.2 7 In contrast, where the patentee
secures revenues by approaching firms that have already
developed so as "to maximize the value of a license," monetary
damages should be sufficient to compensate for infringement.2 s

24.
See generally ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI & ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA,
MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
(2001).
25.
The relative innovativeness of small versus large firms has long been mooted.
From a theoretical standpoint, economists like Oliver Williamson (and more recently Clay
Christensen, William Baumol, and Ashish Arora) have argued that the "high powered
incentives" of small firms and markets are likely to produce more breakthrough
inventions than the lower-wattage incentives of large firms. See id.; William J. Baumol,
EntrepreneurialEnterprises,Large Established Firms and Other Components of the FreeMarket Growth Machine, 23 SMALL BUS. ECON. 9 (2004). Additionally, to the extent that
competition is more likely to arise in environments with many small firms, Kenneth
Arrow's argument that competition breeds innovation also militates in favor of small
firms. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962). Empirical evidence on the question is mixed.
However, it does suggest that at least in some industries, small firms do indeed produce a
disproportionate share of breakthrough inventions. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 7. In
the biopharmaceutical industry in particular, the large number of R&D alliances between
small and large firms testifies to the innovativeness of small firms. At a minimum, small
firms play an important role in the innovation ecosystem.
26.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393.
27.
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 571-72 (E.D. Va.
2007). In this regard, the district court's opinion was in accord with the Supreme Court's
refusal to categorically exclude universities from the possibility of injunctive relief.
28.
Id. at 572. The question of how smaller entities that market technologies should
be treated for purposes of injunctive relief was the subject of a hotly contested Federal
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B. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
In KSR, the Supreme Court addressed the Federal Circuit's
position that, in situations where a prior art reference has to be
modified or combined with another prior art reference to show
the obviousness of a particular patent claim, the challenger (or
PTO examiner) must fipd within the prior art a "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) to modify or combine.2 9 Both the
FTC and NAS reports had criticized this so-called TSM
requirement, and particularly criticized cases like In re Lee, ° in
which the Federal Circuit had appeared to enunciate a bright
line rule requiring written evidence of TSM.3" As the reports
emphasized, such a requirement unduly lowers the bar for
nonobviousness. For example, Internet business method patents
often apply prior art business methods to a network such as the
Internet. Forcing examiners or challengers to identify a specific
written suggestion that a specific business method can be
implemented via software in a networked environment excludes
the common sense and ordinary knowledge of the average artisan.
In its KSR decision, the Supreme Court determined that
although the TSM test provides a "helpful insight"-and possibly
represents a safeguard against hindsight bias-using TSM in a
rigid and formulaic manner (and particularly using it so as to
require written evidence) fails to account for the creativity of the
average scientist against whom obviousness has long been
evaluated." The Court also opined that in some cases, the fact
Circuit appeal, Buffalo Technology Inc. v. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organization (CSIRO). The patentee in question, CSIRO, is an Australian
research institute that generates and licenses technology (in this case a software patent
that reads on a wireless LAN standard). The district court's decision granting injunctive
relief to CSIRO emphasized the eBay Court's reluctance to exclude categorically
injunctive relief for licensors. The court's decision also argued that a failure to grant such
relief would create irreparable harm by making it difficult for CSIRO to license its
patents and thus support its research enterprise. See Commonwealth Scientific & Indus.
Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 601-604 (E.D. Tex. 2007). The
Federal Circuit decision, issued September 19, 2008, ultimately did not reach the question
of remedies, as it found that the district court had erred in its nonobviousness
determination.
29.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740-41 (2007) (discussing the
Federal Circuit's position).
30.
In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
31.
See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 5, at 14-15 (arguing that rigid application
of the TSM rule with written evidence results in issuance of patents in obvious invention
and harms competition); MERRILL, LEVIN & MYERS, supra note 10, at 59-62, 87-88
(detailing dilution of the nonobviousness standard in recent court decisions, resulting in
increased issuance of patents on obvious inventions).
32.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741-43 ("The obviousness analysis cannot be confined... by
overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued
patents.").
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that a given combination was "obvious to try" could suggest
obviousness. According to the Court,
[w]hen there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good
reason to pursue the known options within his or her
technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is
likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and
common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination
was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under
§ 103..
The KSR case thus strengthens the nonobviousness
standard. Moreover, the arguments
it
deploys about
combinations or modifications are facially neutral-the case gives
no indication that the biopharmaceutical industry is exempt from
its holding. On the face of it, then, KSR might be viewed as
detrimentally affecting the biopharmaceutical industry, which
had no quarrel with the older, more lax standard.
But this view of KSR, and of the patent law, is too simplistic.
First, Federal Circuit cases involving the nonobviousness of
small molecule chemical compounds have never adhered to a
bright line rule requiring a written teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to modify or combine prior art references. Rather,
even prior to KSR, these cases looked more broadly at the skill of
the chemist utilizing the person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) standard.34
Second, though it is facially neutral, the standards-based
approach enunciated by the Supreme Court does take into
account the disparate technical realities of information creation
and development in different contexts. The Court's KSR decision
emphasizes that a rigid TSM requirement is particularly
inappropriate where (as in the case before it, which involved an
adjustable electronic gas pedal) the invention in question results
from the combination or modification of "predictable"
technologies used "according to their established function." 5
Similarly, as the quote from the Court's discussion of the

33.
Id. at 1742.
34.
For a similar point, see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma's Nonobvious
Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 375 (2008). Indeed, many nonobviousness cases
decided by the Federal Circuit even prior to KSR did not use a rigid version TSM test. The
test appears to have had particular prominence in a few decisions involving appeals from
the PTO that misconstrue core principles of administrative law. In contrast, many other
Federal Circuit decisions did not even mention the test. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note
7, at 290-292, 331-32.
35.
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739-40 (2007).
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"obvious to try" question makes clear, "obvious to try" means
obvious only in situations involving a "finite number of identified,
predictable solutions.""
In the biopharmaceutical sciences, by contrast, the scientific
reality faced by the PHOSITA is often one of unpredictabilityrelatively small variations in chemical structure can yield
unexpected differences in function. Indeed, under such longestablished cases as In re Dillon, variations with unexpected
properties are the key to finding nonobviousness once a prima
facie case for obviousness has been established.3 8 Moreover, as
noted earlier, the Dillon prima facie test for obviousness-which
looks (quite properly, given what the chemist PHOSITA actually
does in her day-to-day work) at whether the prior art gives
"reason or motivation" to make a modification to a structurally
similar prior art compound-has not limited itself to written
evidence of reason or motivation. The KSR case thus undermines
neither Dillon's emphasis on unexpected properties nor its prima
facie test.
For this reason, in the aftermath of KSR, the
pharmaceutical case law on core product claims to small
molecules has not been markedly different. Indeed, in Takeda v.
Alphapharm, a case involving the patented diabetes drug Actos,
a variation of a previously known compound, "compound b,"
Judge Lourie began by noting that the Dillon test for "prima facie
obviousness for chemical compounds is consistent with the legal
principles enunciated in KSR."39 Judge Lourie also affirmed the
district court's factual finding that the prior art would not have
led a researcher who wanted to find a diabetes drug to compound
b. Nor would it have suggested the particular changes to
compound b made by the patentee. 40 Thus the prima facie case for
obviousness had not been made.
Similarly, in the case of Ortho-McNeil v. Mylan, Chief Judge
Michel upheld a lower court determination regarding the
nonobviousness of topiramate, the active ingredient in Ortho's
Topamax drug. Like Judge Lourie in Takeda v. Alphapharm,
Judge Michel emphasized that the ordinary artisan would have
had no reason to start with the structurally similar compound

36.
Id. at 1742.
37.
Of course, if and when the capacity for quantitative prediction in chemistry
improves, the unpredictability of chemistry may decrease.
38.
See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692-93 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
39.
Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
40.
See id. at 1357-60.
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that the Ortho scientists had used. Nor would they have had
reason to choose "(among several unpredictable alternatives) the
exact route that produced topiramate as an intermediate."" As
such, the prima facie case for nonobviousness had not been made.
Even if it had been made, moreover, topiramate had unexpected
properties that could overcome the prima facie case.42
Of course, post-KSR, the Federal Circuit has decided cases
in which it has struck down claims to particular chemical
compounds. But these are not cases that would necessarily have
been decided differently prior to KSR. For example, in Aventis v.
Lupin, Judge Linn determined that a purified (or "resolved")
composition that had previously existed only in racemic form was
obvious over the prior art racemic form. 3 However, there was no
evidence in that case that the claimed composition was difficult
to isolate or that it displayed any unexpected properties in its
resolved form."
In the midst of the KSR litigation (after the oral argument,
but before the Supreme Court's decision was handed down), the
Federal Circuit did decide one case, Pfizer v. Apotex, that
suggested significant changes for the pharmaceutical industry. In
that case, Chief Judge Michel held that Pfizer's patent on an
amlodipine besylate salt was obvious given the amlodipine
maleate prior art. He found such obviousness even though the
maleate version had significantly different properties than the
besylate version (specifically, greater stability for purposes of
manufacturing) and even though finding the maleate version
required sifting through a list of 53 anions.45 However, given
subsequent case law that has emerged from the Federal Circuit,
it appears that the Pfizer case may be an outlier. Chief Judge
Michel may have been anticipating a more dramatic decision
from the Court than the Court ultimately rendered.
Ultimately, because the Dillon test does not appear to have
been affected by KSR, many of the most common types of patent
applications sought by the biopharmaceutical industry will
continue to pass muster. Consider, for example, the prominent
category of so-called "me-too" drugs. Such drugs typically work
on the same protein target as their predecessors and are

41.
Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
42.
See id. at 1365.
43.
See Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1301-03
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
44.
Id. at 1302.
45.
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1362-63, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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therefore considered part of the same therapeutic class as these
predecessors. 4' However, in order to avoid patents on predecessor
drugs (which generally claim not simply a single molecule but at
least some structural variations), manufacturers of me-too drugs
have to make them substantially distinct as a structural matter
from their predecessors. Therefore patents on these drugs should
continue to be valid post-KSR .
Some have suggested that Pfizer is not an outlier, and thus
the Supreme Court's invigoration of the nonobviousness standard
may affect the pharmaceutical industry in those cases where
firms file additional patent applications on salts or formulations
that are already covered by one or more core structural patents.48
But the pharmaceutical firm practice of filing additional
applications on very small structural variations has always been
one that has had more to do with peculiar features of the 1984
Hatch-Waxman regime for approval of generic drugs than with
patent law per se. In other words, many of these patents might
have been considered obvious even pre-KSR. In particular,
because salts are so close structurally to their prior art
predecessors, their obviousness has always been a close question
under the Dillon test.49
Applications on salts and other small structural variations
have nonetheless been worth filing because Hatch-Waxman
authorizes automatic thirty-month stays of generic approval by
the FDA based solely on the existence of such patents." Indeed,
prior to 2003, pharmaceutical firms could string together
sequential thirty-month stays based on multiple patents,
including new patents secured after a generic had declared its
intention to market, based on its belief that existing patents had
expired or were invalid.5
46.
See, e.g., Arti K Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel
Intellectual Property Strategiesfor Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHICS 1, 4 (2008) (noting that drugs typically work by affecting the activity of protein
targets).
47.
The larger pressure on me-too drugs is likely to come not from patent law but
from a trend on the part of insurers to encourage the use either of generics or of brandname drugs within a given class on which discounts have been negotiated. In 2005, 68% of
employers who provided insurance reported using tiered programs of co-payment to
encourage such lower-cost purchases. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored
Insurance-Ridingthe Health Care Tiger, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 195, 199 (2006).
48.
See Michael Enzo Furrow, PharmaceuticalPatent Life-Cycle Management After
KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275, 311 (2008).
49.
See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 398-99.
50.
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact
on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 190 (1999) (describing
various elements of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
51.
Such "evergreening" practices have been curtailed to some extent by Hatch-
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On the face of it, KSR could have a greater impact on
biologic protein therapeutics than it does on the small molecule
drugs typically manufactured by the pharmaceutical industry.
According to In re Kubin,5' a recent case from the PTO's Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) (currently on appeal to
the Federal Circuit), KSR calls into question the Federal
Circuit's much-criticized In re Deuel decision.5 3 In that 1995 case,
Judge Lourie established a bright-line rule that methods for
finding DNA sequences did not represent appropriate prior art
for product claims to such sequences.54 The BPAI decision in
Kubin states that, after KSR, product claims to DNA sequences
should be considered obvious if the method for finding the DNA
sequence was routine in the art.5 5 Whether or not the BPAI is
correct in holding that KSR speaks directly to the question," the
Federal Circuit may take up the invitation to overturn a case
that has long been criticized as technologically and doctrinally
indefensible.
For present purposes, a potential overruling of Deuel is of
particular interest because commentators have pointed to the
case as a prominent example of the manner in which the Federal
Circuit has set up an "industry-specific" regime for

Waxman amendments passed in 2003 that limit brand name drug makers to stays based
on patents filed before a generic declares its intention to market. However, even with this
limitation, Hatch-Waxman continues to create incentives to file relatively marginal
patent applications. Perhaps the most salient incentive-untouched by the 2003
amendments-is a provision that allow brand name manufacturers to maintain
monopolies based on weak patents through settlement with the first generic challenger.
So long as the settlement agreement requires that the first generic challenger refrain
from transferring to any subsequent generic entrant the first generic's statutory right to a
180-day period of exclusive marketing of the generic, potential entrants have limited
financial incentive to undertake a challenge. See Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1101(a)(2)(A), 117
Stat. 2660, 2448-57 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)); see also Furrow, supra note
48, at 287.
52.
In re Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1410, 1414 (B.P.A.I. 2007).
53.
In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
54.
See id. at 1559.
55.
In re Kubin, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1414.
56.
It is not clear that KSR does in fact speak directly to the holding in Deuel. The
BPAI argues that KSR casts doubt on the proposition, noted briefly in Deuel, that
"obvious to try" does not establish obviousness. The Deuel holding does not rest on this
proposition, however. Moreover, as noted earlier, the KSR court's rejection of the "obvious
to try" proposition is limited to those cases where the number of possible solutions that
are "obvious to try" is finite and predictable. The KSR holding is thus consistent with the
longstanding patent law principle that an invention can be obvious if it is "obvious to try"
and such a trial would have a "reasonable expectation of success." To the extent that the
KSR holding casts doubt on Deuel, it is not because of any new articulation of the "obvious
to try" doctrine but, rather, because of the KSR court's general disapproval of bright line
rules.
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biotechnology.5 7 On this view, Judge Lourie's implicit aim in
articulating a technologically problematic nonobviousness
standard for gene sequences was to allow sequences that could
serve as therapeutic products to be patentable for economic
reasons (i.e., because firms would require a patent in order to
have an incentive to take the therapeutic sequence through
expensive clinical trials) even when they were not patentable as
a technical matter. From this perspective, if Deuel is in fact
overturned, the result could be problematic as an economic
matter, at least for patents on gene sequences that claim
therapeutic products.
Once again, however, the significance of patent law to
returns on investment may be exaggerated. In the case of protein
therapeutics and other biologics, a major source of protection
from competition has been the absence of a Hatch-Waxman type
regime for biologics. Without such a generics regime-which
allows the generic competitor to rely on the brand name
therapy's safety and efficacy data and thus circumvent the
barrier to entry otherwise created by FDA requirements of such
data-there is no significant threat from loss of patent
protection.
Moreover, Deuel itself can hardly be considered a successful
example of industry-specific patent law. To the contrary, it is a
blunt instrument that creates difficulties of at least two sorts.
First, because Deuel effectively replaces nonobviousness with a
novelty standard, the case allows patents not only on obvious
therapeutic proteins but also on obvious gene sequences that
serve as research tools. Races to claim such obvious research tool
patents581 may not (at least thus far) have created an
anticommons or patent thicket for follow-on researchers.
However, a significant reason has been that these patents can be,
and have been, evaded through secret infringement.59 In the
future, such secret infringement may not be possible if the hopes
of some biologists (particularly systems and synthetic biologists)
to develop transparent biological standards are realized. °

57.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1178-80, 1185 (2002).
58.
Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent
Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199, 205-06 (2000).
John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent
59.
Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021, 1021 (2003) ("Infringement of research tool patents is hard to
detect, and because of the long drug development process, the 6-year statute of limitations
may expire before infringement is discovered.").
60.
See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1757 (2007) (noting this point).
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In addition, under boilerplate patent law, the doctrinal logic
of Deuel mandates that patent protection for biologics must be (at
least in theory) quite narrow in scope-if methods cannot serve
as prior art for DNA sequence claims, they cannot serve as part
of the tool kit by which the ordinary artisan is shown how to
"make and use" a genus of DNA sequences." Brand name
biologics firms are currently emphasizing the ineffectual
protection afforded by this narrow scope when they insist that
the various generic biologics bills currently being considered by
Congress must provide a long (e.g., fourteen-year) data
exclusivity period for the brand name manufacturer.6 2 (In
contrast, for new chemical drugs, data exclusivity for the brand
name new chemical entity generally lasts about five years.)63
Deuel thereby illustrates the tremendous line-drawing difficulties
with using garden-variety patent law to take into account a
problem that arises not in an "industry," but, rather, in the
narrower context of end-product therapeutics.64
IV. THE WAY FORWARD

This Part considers briefly how additional facially neutral
patent reform measures, as well as tweaks to FDA and health
insurance regulation, could take into account remaining
economic concerns.

61.

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 57, at 1179-82.

62. See, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME
WITHOUT STRONG DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 4

(2007), available at http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/FOBSMarket-exclusivity_
20070926.pdf.
63.

Id. at 1.

64. Whether this 14-year data exclusivity will in fact be necessary is an open
question, however. If, as appears likely, Congress decides that biologics are sufficiently
different from small molecule drugs that bioequivalence cannot be proven through simple
comparisons of end products (consistent with the view taken by some scientists and by
most brand name biologics makers that, in the area of biologics, "the process is the
product"), there will be no such thing as a "generic" biologics manufacturers. Rather, we
will have "follow-on" manufacturers that themselves have to submit independently
developed safety and efficacy data based on their own manufacturing processes. In that
case, the number of follow-on manufacturers may be quite limited. Additionally, both
brand name and follow-on manufacturers will likely be able to charge supra-competitive
prices even after patents expire. For thorough discussions of these points, see, for
example, D.M. Dudzinski & A.S. Kesselheim, Scientific and Legal Viability of Follow-On
ProteinDrugs, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 843 (2008); Henry G. Grabowski, David B. Ridley &
Kevin A. Schulman, Entry and Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION ECON. 439 (2007). The current debate over biologics legislation is thus yet

another illustration of the manner in which patent law per se often has only a limited role
to play in the ultimate pricing structure of biopharmaceutical products.
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A. Possibilitiesfor (Additional)FaciallyNeutral PatentReform
As noted earlier, technically obvious patents of the type
conferred by Deuel have been justified as useful from an
economic policy standpoint. Currently, they may not be
absolutely necessary, as the absence of a generic biologics regime
confers barriers to entry at least as significant as those conferred
by patent law. However, if Deuel is overturned, and a generics
biologics regime is in fact implemented, some additional
protections for technically obvious protein therapeutics may be
necessary. More generally, to the extent that the inability to
secure patents on technically obvious, or even nonnovel,
therapeutics is a persistent problem, FDA administered rights of
exclusive marketing for such therapeutics represent a possible
solution." As this Article has argued, disrupting the patent
system to address problems raised by one type of invention can
generate all sorts of undesirable collateral consequences.
Of course, regulatory regimes that focus on one type of
invention raise political economy concerns that the regime will be
unduly favorable to the interests of the industry that
manufactures the invention. Indeed, this political economy
concern represents an important additional argument against
industry-specific patent regimes (that is, in addition to the
problem of line-drawing, discussed above). However, in the case
of FDA exclusivities, the problem may be mitigated to some
extent by the existence of a robust generic pharmaceutical sector.
A different problem with reliance on FDA-administered
rights is the possibility that, even outside the area of
biopharmaceutical therapeutics, the validity standards of the
patent system may not always account for all relevant economic
considerations. I turn next to this more general issue.
From the standpoint of economic policy, the relevant question
is whether validity standards promote innovation (both initial
invention and any necessary development/commercialization) that
would not have happened "but for" the incentive of the patent.6 6

65.
Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). Roin further notes that the duration of such rights might
be based on the FDA's determination of the therapeutic value of the drug. To some extent,
the Orphan Drug Act, which is administered by the FDA and confers marketing
exclusivity on unpatentable therapeutics that address the needs of small disease
populations, could be a model.
66.
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 7, at 277. This is the classic economic frame for the
inquiry into patent validity. Some more recent discussions on how patent validity,
particularly nonobviousness, should be analyzed focus not on the "but for" question (which
necessarily looks at a single invention) but on the more complex question of how
nonobviousness could be used to channel researchers into lines of inquiry that are

1054

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[45:4

The doctrinal construct of the PHOSITA-particularly a
PHOSITA that, post-KSR, actually has the skill of the average
scientist in a given area of innovation-already reflects economic
considerations to some extent. Where knowledge in a particular
area of science or technology is relatively well codified-and
hence the innovation is rapid and not too expensive-the
PHOSITA construct will deliver the economically desirable result
of a nonobviousness standard that is high.67 Additionally, the
time-honored canon that an innovation that is obvious to try can
nonetheless be worthy of a patent if the uncertainty associated
with actually making the innovation is high, takes economic
considerations into account.6 8 Uncertain innovations are precisely
the types of expensive innovations for which a relatively low
nonobviousness standard is likely to be a necessary "but for"
incentive.6 9
Conventional patent doctrine has been quite successful in
using technical uncertainty as a proxy for the ultimate economic
inquiry. However, in certain limited cases, it may be appropriate
to engage in the reverse inquiry-that is, to use the high cost of
an R&D project as an indication of technical uncertainty. Indeed,
as Robert Merges has noted, although patent law doctrine has
not formally used high cost as a proxy for technical uncertainty,
various cases have done so informally." Explicitly acknowledging

superior from a social welfare perspective to alternative lines of inquiry (even if all such
lines of inquiry would satisfy the "but for" standard). See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer &
Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547 (2008). A discussion of how such a comparative inquiry might
work (either for a patent examiner or for the courts) is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the challenges (and risks of error) associated with administering this type of
inquiry are likely to be significant. At some level, the analysis proposed by these
discussions appears to require government institutions to pick scientific and technological
"winners and losers." But one well-rehearsed reason for having a patent system is that it
does not require such expertise on the part of government institutions.
67. John Barton, NonObviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492-493 (2003); Robert Hunt,
Patentability,Industry Structure, and Innovation, 52 J. INDUS. ECON. 401 (2004) (arguing
that the nonobviousness standard should be high where an "industry" is innovating
rapidly). Barton and Hunt invoke the idea of "industry"-based patent law and suggest
their approach is "industry-specific." However, as this Article has argued, the facially
neutral PHOSITA standard, which operates at the level of invention (or categories of
invention), is a much more fine-tuned mechanism for implementing policy goals than
blunt constructs like an "industry."
68. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 18-19 (explaining the nonobviousness standard from an economic point of
view).
69. See generally id. (discussing the need for a low nonobviousness standard where
the R&D question is uncertain).
70. Id. at 43-50.
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high cost as an indicator of technical uncertainty would not be a
significant doctrinal stretch.7'
In models such as Merges's that counsel a low
nonobviousness standard where the cost associated with R&D is
high, the inquiry into a patent application's validity is generally
framed as taking place at the end of the R&D process. Thus both
uncertain/costly research and uncertain/costly development
prospects count in favor of the patent applicant. One limitation of
these models is that they do not explicitly account for cases
(perhaps most prominently biopharmaceutical therapies but
perhaps also other cases) where the inquiry into patent validity
is made very early (perhaps too early) in the R&D process. To put
the point another way, these models do not account for those
areas of innovation that follow the prescription (and description)
associated with Edmund Kitch's view that patents should be
granted on early-stage "prospects" rather than complete
inventions.72
In cases where patent validity determinations are made
early in the process, a patent examiner (or, subsequently, a
court) who uses even the most expansive definition of technical
uncertainty could, under current law, legitimately find the
prototype invention in question obvious, both to try and to make.
This is because the technical uncertainty in question involves
future commercialization. difficulty. In such cases, it might be
of
for the future cost and uncertainty
appropriate
73
commercialization to be a reason for granting a patent.
Of course, there are reasons to question whether patent
examiners (and, to a significant but perhaps lesser extent, courts)
would have the institutional competence to referee claims that
abnormally high cost, past or future, reflected technical
uncertainty. In many if not most cases, patentees would no doubt
be tempted to make vigorous arguments about how their costs
reflected underlying technical uncertainty. A large percentage of
these arguments could be based on dubious data or simply reflect

It bears emphasis that high cost per se (e.g., the high cost associated with, say,
71.
building a highway) should not be a reason for granting a patent. Allowing patents to be
issued for projects (again, for example, highway building) that do not contribute any sort
of technical information to the world would raise serious constitutional concerns. The
constitutional mandate requires, after all, that patents advance progress in the "useful
Arts." In contrast with highway building, the applied research involved in development
contributes significant technical information to the world. I thank John Golden for
pressing me on this point.
72.
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
EcON. 265 (1977).
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 7, at 277-78.
73.
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inefficient R&D processes. In the ex parte process typically used
by patent examiners, the result might be overly generous patent
grants. In court proceedings, the result could be "battles of
economic experts" that would probably be even more intractable
than current battles of scientific experts. Thus arguments where
cost, past or future, is being used as a proxy for technical
uncertainty should be subject to a significantly higher burden of
proof than direct technical arguments in favor of patentability.
A logical counterpart (and counterweight) to using cost as a
reason for allowing patents might involve denying patents on the
basis of low cost. Under the latter doctrine, an invention that was
technically nonobvious might be deemed unpatentable because
there was no good economic reason for patenting it. Again, for
reasons of institutional competence, economic nonpatentability
should be subject to stricter evidentiary burdens than technical
nonpatentability. The patent examiner or challenger that wanted
to invoke the doctrine should certainly (at a minimum) bear the
burden of proof.
B. FDA and Health Insurance Regulation
As noted earlier, the possibility of FDA-administered
marketing exclusivity periods for nonnovel, or obvious,
therapeutics is an interesting one. For purposes of fostering
social welfare goals, some additional tweaks in the role of the
FDA could also be useful. For example, some prominent
commentators have argued that, for drug approval purposes, the
FDA should require not simply testing against a placebo (as is
often the case currently) but, rather, against the best available
drug in the relevant therapeutic class. Approval would be
withheld if the drug under scrutiny did not have a superior
effectiveness or safety profile. 4
Approval per se should not necessarily be conditional on
testing against a best-in-class drug. As Mike Scherer has noted,
because differences in efficacy would probably be smaller than in
placebo-controlled trials, such head-to-head comparisons would
require significantly larger sample sizes in order to achieve
statistical significance. 5 Requiring firms to fund such trials may
add unduly to the costs of drug development. But publicly
funded, FDA-administered comparative testing of drugs would
74.

MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE

US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 240-41 (2004). Marcia Angell is a former editor in chief of
the medical profession's flagship journal, the New England Journal of Medicine.
75.
F.M. Scherer, Uncertainty and Choice: The Challenges of Pharmaceutical
Efficacy, Safety, and Cost, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 267, 277-278 (2007).
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provide a useful public good. Specifically, such publicly funded
testing would generate much-needed information for insurance
markets that need to make cost-benefit determinations about
coverage. Thus such public funding is certainly worth
considering.
Finally, it bears emphasis that both statutory and common
law regulatory structures need to be reformed so as to provide
protection against tort liability for insurance firms that make
cost-benefit determinations about pharmaceutical and biologic
coverage. Although a discussion of such reform is beyond the
scope of this Article, several health law scholars (perhaps most
prominently my colleagues Clark Havighurst and Barak
Richman) have provided useful frameworks for thinking about
such reform. 6
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that facially neutral patent reform
can achieve economic policy goals-including accommodating the
legitimate interests of different industries-without forcing
decisionmakers to make crude line-drawing determinations.
Additionally, to the extent that the biopharmaceutical sector may
need innovation policy that explicitly addresses peculiar
problems associated with end product therapeutics, such policy is
more effectively supplied through tweaks in FDA regulation and
regulation of insurance markets than through changes in patent
law. A larger point emerges from this analysis: in addressing any
given innovation policy challenge, analysts should consider
carefully the full range of regulatory systems available. In many
cases, the best solution to the challenge may involve invoking
more than one system.

76.
See generally Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Who Pays? Who
Benefits? DistributionalIssues in Health Care, 69 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2007).

